Abstract
Introduction
Since the nineteenth century, public economists and political scientists have long been interested in the growth of governments (Larkey et al. 1981) . Witnessing a significant growth in governments over the recent several decades and concomitant frustration of the general public with 'big governments,' numerous researchers have studied why governments continue to grow. Inquires have examined a variety of questions including which factors cause governments to grow; under what mechanisms government expenditures are determined; and what impact government growth has upon the overall economy. The literature on this issue is so wide and extensive that Lybeck (1988) classified the literature into twelve theories, and Tarschys (1975) suggested nine broad categories and 25 explanations for government growth, although both authors admitted that their coverage is by no means exhaustive.
One of the key factors behind government growth identified by this literature is technological development (Tarschys 1975 , North 1985 . Specifically, the industrial revolution fueled by technological advances and accompanying societal changes such as urbanization have led governments to increase their influence on the economy. Against this backdrop, I propose another technological factor that may influence the growth of governments in the post-industrial era -information technology (IT). Considering that IT plays a crucial role in transforming many aspects of the economy, be it in the private or public sector, I aim at exploring whether IT investments made by governments can change or keep the course of government growth.
The relationship between IT investments and organization size in the for-profit context is among key research interests in the information systems (IS) literature. For example, an industry-level analysis by Brynjolfsson et al. (1994) shows that the level of industry IT stock is related to a smaller size of firms as measured by the number of employees, sales, and value added per establishment. Also in an industry-level study, Wood et al. (2008) find that the relationship varies across industry sectors; IT investments are associated with smaller firm size in manufacturing industries and with larger firm size in retail and service industries. One of the few studies at the organizational level, Hitt (1999) finds that increased use of IT is associated with an increase in vertical integration and a decrease in diversification. However, few studies, if any, in IS and public economics have paid much attention to the effect of IT investments on government size.
To fill this gap, I offer theoretical arguments and empirical evidence regarding the role of IT in government growth at the context of U.S. state governments. Drawing on market-based and institutional theories of government expenditures, I give four explanations for the impact of IT on government growth. First, on the supply side, automating manual, labor-intensive administrative processes enables governments to produce public goods and services with a smaller amount of input. In other words, IT improves the productivity of public good production (Brynjolfson and Hitt 1996, Dewan and Kraemer 2000) . Consequently, IT investments can be expected to lead to smaller governments, provided that the demand of public goods remains unchanged. Second, more digitalized, transparent administrative processes and increased availability of information on governments' actions and decision making alleviate the information asymmetry problem between principals (voters and legislatures) and agents (bureaus) (Horn 1995) . This effect can make the monitoring activities of legislatures (Bendor et al. 1985 , Banks 1989 ) more effective and thereby curb the power of bureaucrats, which may lead to excessive government expenditures (Niskanen 1968, Miller and Joe 1983) .
On the demand side, enhanced communication between citizens and government officials promoted by eGovernment initiatives (West 2004 ) helps citizens and interest groups become well-informed about government administration, facilitating their monitoring role on governments. In turn, this further assists the checks-and-balances mechanism of legislatures (Banks and Weingast 1992) , again leading to smaller governments. Finally, more efficient production of public goods and more effective administrative processes may reduce the price of public goods. A reduction in tax price may increase the demand for governments' production of public goods and possibly lead to the expansion of governments. These contrasting arguments pose us a significant challenge in predicting how IT affects the size of governments. Instead of making a specific prediction, therefore, I offer two competing hypotheses that greater use of IT and digitization by governments either expands or shrinks government expenditures.
Next, adopting the state government growth model proposed by Garand (1988 Garand ( , 1989 as the empirical framework, I examine the effects of IT investments in the context of U.S. state governments. I utilize data from a variety of sources. I obtained the 5-year data on IT expenditures and organizations in state governments from the NASCIO Compendium of Digital Governments in the States. I also gathered data on state expenditure, tax revenue, payroll and so forth from the U.S. Census Bureau. The primary independent variable in the empirical analyses is IT intensity (Bharawaj et al. 1999 , Anderson et al. 2006 , which is measured in two ways -the ratio of IT budget to state gross domestic product (GDP), and per capita IT budget. I choose the proportion of annual expenditures to state GDP, one of the common measures of government size in the public economics literature (e.g. Lowery and Berry 1983 , Borcherding 1985 , Saunders 1993 , as a dependent variable. I build a 5-year unbalance panel consisting of 190 observations in 44 states. The empirical model based on the state government growth model (Garand 1988 ) is estimated using the dynamic panel data estimation technique developed by Blundell and Bond (1998) .
This work contributes to the IS and public economics literature by suggesting a new technological factor for government expenditures. This study is also among few studies that examine the relationship between IT spending and organization size, especially at the organizational level, compared to industry-level studies (Brynjolfsson et al. 1994 , Woods et al. 2008 ).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The subsequent section offers the theoretical discussion and develops the hypotheses. The third section describes data sources, measures, and methodology. Next, the results from empirical investigations are presented. The paper concludes with discussions, limitations, and future research directions.
Theoretical Development
This section provides the theoretical arguments regarding the relationship between IT investments and government size. I draw on three theoretical models on government size from the public economy and political science literature to derive the hypotheses. Fiorina and Noll (1978) provide a public good production model 1 that incorporates bureaucracy costs and legislative facilitation services. In their model, to request the production of public goods that they desire, citizens may incur an external cost in dealing with government officials, and this external cost can be reduced by legislators who offer facilitation services. Among such external costs are those associated with discovering the appropriate entry point to a government agency, with communicating with the agency, and with sending the information on the public good demand to the agency officials. In facilitation services, legislators provide constituents with a support in dealing with the bureaucracy 2 .
The Production of Public Goods with Legislative Facilitation Model (Fiorina and Noll 1978)
In the formal model, there are m districts, each of which n voters reside in. Each district is represented by a legislator. A voter is endowed with income y ij ( 1,..., i n = , 1,..., j m = ). She consumes the private good z ij and the public good K produced by a government agency. Her utility function is given by ( , ) ij ij U z K . She pays a tax t ij and incurs the external bureaucracy cost ( , ) ij C B F , where B is the size of the agency and F ij indicates the amount of facilitation services offered by the legislator who represents the district j. C is increasing in B and decreasing in F ij . Thus, the voter's budget constraint is given by,
The production of public good K requires two inputs -the agency B and other inputs X. The prices of the two inputs are P B and P X , respectively, and the production function is given by ( , ) f B X . The purchase of the two inputs is appropriated to by tax revenue. In addition, part of the tax revenue is spent in generating facilitation services, whose price is P f . Therefore, the tax revenue must be equivalent to the sum of the purchase of inputs and facilitation services as follows.
, , Fiorina and Noll (1978) solve three maximization problems in their work, depending on who a decision maker is -a social welfare maximization problem; a decentralization decision problem which maximizes the median voter's welfare 3 ; and a budget maximization problem in which bureaucrats are interested in maximizing budget. For example, the social welfare maximization problem is given by m a x , ( , )
With respect to the effects of IT in the context of the above problem, some implications can be derived. First, as predicted by the literature of IT business value, the use of IT will improve the productivity of public good production. This implies that given the amount of public goods K to be produced, the use of inputs B and X can be reduced. Thus, as long as K remains unchanged, the budget size B X P B P X + may decrease in IT investments.
Second, the use of IT and the Internet may decrease the bureaucracy cost C. An example is TampaGov Customer Service Center in Tampa, Florida (Cantler 2007) . This Web site provides citizens with a one-point contact point to city-wide agencies and departments. Among other tools, it features a communication tool for submitting service requests and inquiries, a self-service payment system for utility and tax, and a self-service public records search tool. Each inquiry or request submitted to the system is automatically re-directed to city officials who are in charge of it, and a requestor can track the progress of processing with a unique tracking number on this site. This example illustrates that automated administrative processes and online communication with citizens assist constituents in dealing with the agencies. Consequently, IT investments may lead to a reduction in C, which in turn may increase the citizens' willingness to pay (t ij ) for the public goods. Therefore, a reduction in C may lead to an increase in the budget size B X P B P X + . Banks (1989) proposes a political control model of bureaucracy in the presence of information asymmetry and conflicts of interests. His work models a budget decision game between a legislature and a bureaucratic agency. The legislature has an authority to approve the budget proposed by the agency, but has limited information on the actual cost of administration. The agency is interested in maximizing the budget size (b), while the legislature's interest is to maximize the benefit to voters net of the budget ( v b − ).
Political Control of Bureaucracy Model (Banks 1989)
In his model, the benefit of a certain public good is v and is known to both the legislature and the agency. On the other hand, the cost of production c is known only to the agency. The legislature is only aware of the distribution of the cost, ( ) f c . The budget decision game proceeds as follows. Discovering the true cost c, the agency submits a budget request b to the legislature. The legislature has three options. With a probability of α 1 , it accepts this budget request. With a probability of α 2 , it conducts an audit with cost of k and discovers the true value of c. The budget size becomes c after the audit. With a probability of 1 2 1 α α − − , the legislature rejects the budget request. Banks (1989) derives the sequential equilibrium strategies of the legislature and the agency as follows.
where c' is the solution of 
Based on this model, a prediction can be made regarding the impact of IT investments on the expenditure size. First, automation and digitization by IT systems in production processes brings a reduction in the production cost c. Second, even though the legislature cannot observe the true cost c, it can still expect the cost reduction. Therefore, the legislature's prior cost distribution ( ) f c is shifted to the left. This shift in turn increases both k * and c', so that the auditing becomes more feasible (Eq. 6), and the agency's budget request is more likely to reveal the true cost c (Eq. 7). Third, digitized administration processes can collect most information regarding costs and decision making, enabling the legislature to conduct an audit with a less cost. Thus, IT investments may lead to a smaller k. All these three effects contribute to a decrease in the expected budget ( , , ) B v c k .
Continuing his work, Banks and Weingast (1992) explain the role of constituency and pressure groups in this model. They argue that "politicians cannot hope to monitor hundreds of agencies by themselves and instead rely on their constituents to do so" (p. 519). Thus, constituents who are organized and informed about agencies' administration can contribute to a reduction in the auditing cost k by "conveying relevant information to politicians" (p. 519). Once again, digitized administrative processes can facilitate constituency's monitoring activities, leading to a reduction in k and thereby the budget size ( , , ) B v c k . For instance, the National Taxpayers Union was able to discover illegitimate expenditures in State of Missouri agencies via the Missouri Accountability Portal (http://mapyourtaxes.mo.gov) (Government Technology 2008a) . This Web site publishes comprehensive financial records of the state agencies on a daily basis. This database helps both citizens and the legislatures to monitor bureaucrats' activities and to curb their unnecessary use of tax revenue. The City of New York also operates a similar Web site called NYCStat (http://www.nyc.gov/html/ops/nycstat/) that posts a variety of information related to city-wide services, including city agency performance records and customer satisfaction reports (Public CIO 2009) .
In sum, the model of Banks (1999) provides a prediction that more IT investments in governments are associated with a smaller size of government expenditures.
Pressure Group Competition Model (Becker 1983)
Becker (1983) presents a model of competition among pressure groups for political influence. He asserts that "individuals belong to particular groups that are assumed to use political influence to enhance the well-being of their members, and competition among these pressure groups for political influence determines the equilibrium structure of taxes, subsidies and other political factors." (p. 372) In this regard, he models how political influences 4 exercised by pressure groups determine the size of income redistribution, one of the primary role of governments (Stiglitz 2000) and how group size and efficiency of influence activities affect on the size of redistribution.
His analytic model considers two pressure groups -taxpayers (t) and recipients (s). The population of two groups is n t and n s , respectively. Each taxpayer pays R t , while each recipient receives a subsidy of R s . The total size of subsidy is governed by the following function.
Here, F represents a tax collection function. In the model, ( )
F ≤ , and '' 0 F ≤ , indicating the presence of deadweight costs in tax collection. By the same token, G refers to a redistribution function, and ( )
' 1 G ≥ , and '' 0 G ≥ , again representing the deadweight costs in distribution. The two pressure groups exercise political influence I t and I s , respectively, and both R t and R s are functions of I t and I s . In turn, I t and I s are determined by the size of corresponding groups (n t and n s ) and the amount of resources (money, time, and other efforts) each group spends in galvanizing political influences. Becker (1983) solves the optimal amount of resources each group spends in producing political influence and finds that the political effectiveness of a group is determined by its relative efficiency in organizing pressures and controlling free-riding.
Another key finding of his model is that an increase in deadweight costs reduces the equilibrium subsidy (S) (Proposition 2 in p. 381). Here, an increase in deadweight costs is represented by a decrease in F' or a reduction in G'. When it comes to IT investments, this finding implies that enhanced, streamlined processes in tax collection or subsidy payment resulting from the use of IT reduce deadweight costs in tax collection and subsidy distribution and thus expand the size of subsidy. For instance, at the distribution side, some U.S. states such as California and Tennessee are using IT systems to reduce illegitimate Medicaid payments (Government Technology 2008) . Software such as data mining and analytic solutions is adopted in detecting fraudulent or unnecessary payment cases. At the tax collection side, Franklin County, Ohio, adopts address verification software to reduce the number of undelivered tax bills, collecting millions of unpaid taxes (Government Technology 2010) . Therefore, the model of Becker (1983) provides a prediction that government IT investments lead to an expansion of government expenditures.
The Relationship between IT Investments and Government Size
The discussions above have suggested mixed relationships between IT investments and government size, as summarized in Table 1 . According to the model of Banks (1989) , government size is negatively related to IT investments, while Becker (1983) illustrates a positive impact of IT. The model of Fiorina and Noll (1978) implies the presence of both effects. In sum, greater IT investments may enhance the productivity of public good production and make the monitoring activities of citizens and legislatures less costly, leading to a smaller government. At the same time, enhanced efficiency and effectiveness of administrative processes imply that the price of public goods decreases, and thus the demand for public goods may become greater, as long as the price elasticity of demand for public goods is positive. This raises a possibility that IT investments are associated with a bigger government.
Thus, rather than making a specific prediction, I offer the two competing hypotheses and try to investigate which effect prevails in the context of U.S. state governments. 
Supply-Side Explanation
Automated administrative processes improve the productivity of production of public goods and services.
Negative Fiorina and Noll (1978) , Banks (1989) Greater use of IT facilitates the monitoring role of legislatures.
Negative Banks (1989) Demand-Side Explanation
Citizens are more-informed via e-Governments initiatives and more engaged in monitoring administration.
Negative Banks (1989) , Banks and Weingast (1992) More efficient production of public goods increases the demand for the public goods.
Positive Fiorina and Noll (1978) , Becker (1983) 
Empirical Models
I adopt the state government growth model proposed by Garand (1988 Garand ( , 1989 as a basis for the empirical analyses. Table 2 describes the variables and data sources. The detailed description of some of the variables is available in Appendix.
The measure of government size is the ratio of state government expenditures to state GDP. In measuring government size, I follow Garand (1988) by using different price deflators for government size and GDP. Public economists argue that due to inherent inefficiencies in the public sector, government expenditures may increase to a greater extent than private sector spending does (Larkey et al. 1981) . Garand (1988, p. 842) states that "if inflation rate is higher in the public sector, … the share of total economic output going to the governmental sector will increase even if the scope of government activity remains constant. This results in a 5-year unbalanced panel with 190 observations from 44 states. Table 3 shows the list of states and the number of appearances in my dataset. t-tests do not reject the hypotheses that states in the sample and those that are not do not differ significantly with respect to population, GDP, and total expenditures. Garand (1988 Garand ( , 1989 lists several explanatory variables for state government size (Table 2) . First, Wagner's Law (Lybeck 1988 , Gemmell 1993 suggests that government size is a function of industrialization, economic affluence and population growth. To account for this effect, Garand chooses income and population as explanatory variables. The sign of these variables is expected to be positive. Second, the fiscal illusion hypothesis suggests that certain tax and finance systems may in effect hide the costs of public good production. This leads taxpayers to underestimate the true prices and thus to demand more production of public goods than they would if they are aware of true prices. Such a tax system includes withholding provisions (personal income tax), indirect taxes (corporate income taxes), and complex tax systems. Also, a large level of debt service and intergovernmental grants from the federal government may also contribute to fiscal illusion (Grossman et al. 1999 , Geys 2006 . I control for five variables of tax and fiscal systems in the estimations as shown in Table 2 . I expect that the sign of INDTAX, CORPTAX, DEBT, and FEDGRANT is positive, while that of COMPLEX is negative, as a high Herfindahl index indicates a simple tax system.
Third, the party control explanation implies that "government growth is systematically related to control of governmental policy-making institutions by the liberal party within the state political system" (Garand 1988, p. 839) . This suggests that a political control by the Democratic Party is related to greater growth of government. I control for two variables that represent the political control in state governments and legislatures. Fourth, government expenditures are also largely determined by the influence of pressure groups as Becker (1983) explains. One of such a pressure group is government employees, who as voters may demand an increase in government spending in order to expand their power and to ensure their job security. Following this bureau voting hypothesis, I include the ratio of state and local government employees to state population as a control variable. According to this hypothesis, the more population is employed by governments, the greater government expenditure is likely to be. Lastly, though not included in Garand (1988) model, budgeting processes may affect the size of government expenditure. According to the National Association of State Budget Officers (NASBO), two budgeting processes are most widely usedprogram budgeting and incremental budgeting (NASBO 2002) . The former refers to a budgeting based on program goals and objectives, and the latter is based on incremental changes in budgets from previous fiscal years and appropriation trends. I include two dummy variables for budgeting processes. I obtained state budgeting information from Budgeting Process in States published by NASBO.
The following equation shows the complete empirical model.
where i and t represents a state, year, respectively, and IT_INTENSITY = IT1 or IT2. Also v i and ε i,t are terms for state-specific unobserved heterogeneity and idiosyncratic errors, respectively. I choose a two-year lag of IT intensity measure, as the impact of IT investments is not likely to materialize immediately due to organizational learning and adjustment effects (Brynjolfsson 1993) . I however estimate the models with different lag lengths, and the main results do not change considerably. As government size may be affected by state-specific unobserved heterogenity (v i ) that may be correlated with explanatory variables, I estimate the above model with the fixed-effect estimation. However, the fixed-effect estimation does not address the bias due to a correlation between v i and the lagged measure of government size (GOVSIZE t-1 ) (Kiviet 1995 , Bond 2002 . Hence, Eq. 14 has to be estimated by a dynamic panel data model (Roodman 2006) . Specifically, I also adopt a two-step System Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) estimation outlined by Arellano and Bover (1995) and developed by Blundell and Bond (1998) . I choose a System GMM approach over a Difference GMM model (Arellano and Bond 1991) because the former does not drop the first-year of observations. Therefore, a System GMM estimation increases a degree of freedom in the estimations. Following the suggestion of Roodman (2006) , I include year dummies in Eq. 14 to ensure that there is no autocorrelation between idiosyncratic disturbances. In addition, to address the issue of a large number of instruments, I follow Roodman (2009) by including only the first three lags of government size as instruments. Table 6 presents the estimation results of Eq. 14 with fixed-effects (Columns 1-3) and System GMM models (Columns 4-6). Columns 1 and 4 show the estimation without IT intensity variables for the nine-year observations from 2000 to 2008. Comparing Column 1 and 4, I find that System GMM estimation changes the sign and significance of some coefficients, implying the present of biases in fixed-effects estimation. Thus, I consider System GMM estimation as the baseline estimation for interpretations. The coefficient of income (Column 4) suggests that contrary to the theoretic prediction in Garand (1988) , the higher median household income is, the smaller state government expenditures becomes. This result can be explained by the theory of Meltzer and Richard (1981) . Based on the median-voter theory, their theoretical model posits that as the ratio of mean income to median income increases, government spending expands as well. This is because a decisive voter with the median income demands more income redistribution as the voter's income decreases. Meltzer and Richard (1983) provide empirical support to this proposition, and it appears that my estimation does as well. (2) Regarding fiscal illusion hypotheses, as expected, the coefficient of tax complexity is negative and significant. Since a smaller Herfindahl index represents a more complex tax system, it appears that states with more complex tax systems demonstrate greater expenditure figures. Column 4 shows that a high federal grant level accelerates the expansion of government expenditures.
Results
The estimations with IT intensity variables in Table 6 show a negative relationship between IT intensity and state government size. Even though the coefficients of two IT intensity variables in fixed-effect regressions (Columns 2 and 3) are found to be insignificant, these become statistically significant at the 1% level in the System GMM estimations (Columns 5, 6) . From the coefficient of IT1 in Column 5, I calculate that a $1 increase in per capita IT budget is associated with a $3.88 reduction in per capita general expenditures 7 .
This result shows that greater IT investments are associated with smaller government expenditures, providing support to Hypothesis 1A. This finding suggests that in the context of U.S. state governments, the effect of improved productivity and effective bureaucracy control overwhelms the opposite effect of increasing demands for public services. To put it differently, my estimations with a two-year lag of IT intensity indicate that productivity improvement resulting from IT investments is realized in a relatively short period of time, but such improvement appears not to lead to an immediate increase in the demand for government services. When the lag length is varied from no lag to a three-year lag in the estimations (Table 7) , the coefficients of IT intensity (IT1) with the System GMM model are consistently negative at the 10% level of significance, offering further support to Hypothesis 1A.
The validity of assumptions for System GMM estimation is tested with the approach of Levine et al. (2000) . Hansen (1982) J test in Columns 4 and 5 of Table 6 show that the null hypotheses of over-identifying restrictions cannot be rejected with 16 degrees of freedom, indicating that the instrumental variables are exogenous. In addition, Arelleno and Bond (1991) tests do not reveal the presence of second-order correlations in differenced error terms.
In order to further check the robustness of the main result, I adopt alternative measures for state government size to estimate the effect of IT intensity. As Table 8 demonstrates, I use three different dependent variables for government size -per capita general expenditures, general expenditures per state employee, and the ratio of GDP of general expenditures net of current operation expenses and capital outlays. Table 8 reveals that a higher IT intensity is associated with smaller per capita government expenditures (Column 1 and 2) as well as with smaller expenditures per state employee (Column 3 and 4). IT intensity is also negatively associated with the size of expenditures that do not account for current operation expense including payroll and capital outlay (Column 5 and 6), suggesting that IT investments may reduce not only cost components of expenditures but also other components such as intergovernmental expenditures or direct subsidies.
The size of government expenditure may depend on other demographic and socioeconomic factors that are not accounted for in Eq. 14. Given that a major portion of state government expenditures are devoted to primary and secondary education and public welfare programs such as Medicaid, I include additional control variables such as the proportion of the elderly population, that of under 18, and poverty level. Including these variables does not change the main result significantly. In addition, some of the control variables may not be necessarily exogenous. For instance, state government employment or debt level may be influenced by the size of expenditures, possibly causing a simultaneity bias. I re-estimated Eq. 14 with System GMM assuming that GOVEMP and DEBT are endogenous. The coefficients of IT intensity are still negative and statistically significant.
Taken together, my empirical analyses provide preliminary evidence that IT investments are associated with a productivity improvement in the production of public goods and a reduction in the monitoring cost incurred by legislatures and voters, resulting in smaller governments. 2000-2008; 2) Wald statistics; 3) p-value. The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are exogenous.; 4) p-value. Arellano-Bond test for AR(2). The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order serial correlation. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05 , ***p < 0.01; N = 190; standard errors are in parentheses; year dummies are omitted In System GMM estimation, only the first three lags are used for instruments; # of instruments = 35 1) p-value. The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are exogenous.; 2) p-value. Arellano-Bond test for AR(2). The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order serial correlation. 
Conclusion
Motivated by the fact that government growth is a persistent, prevalent phenomenon in many industrialized nations (Saunders 1993) , I investigate whether and how IT investments affect this trend. Based on the literature on public good production, bureaucracy, and public choices, I theorize the relationship between IT investments and government size.
The empirical analysis confirms the hypothesis that more IT investments in state governments are associated with smaller government size. Estimations with the dynamic panel-data model provided by Blundell and Bond (1998) find a negative relationship between IT intensity and state government expenditures at the 1%-level of significance. Specifically, the result shows that a $1 increase in per capita IT budget is associated with a $3.88 reduction in per capita general expenditures. I also find that this result is robust to the use of different measures for government size such as per capita general expenditures, and the ratio to GDP of expenditures net of current operation expenses and capital outlays.
Not only is this study one of the first studies on IT investments in governments, but it contributes to the literature by proposing a new perspective in IT value studies. To the best of my knowledge, few studies, if any, have examined the performance effect of IT investments in the public sector. In addition, not only is my study one of the few studies that investigate the impact of IT on organization size in the public sector, but it also identifies this impact with an organizational-level analysis, compared to industry-level studies including Brynjolfsson et al. (1994) and Wood et al. (2008) .
The present study is not without limitations. First, on the theoretical side, the use of the theoretical models in the second section may not fully explain every aspect of government expenditures. I will further review the literature on government expenditures and attempt to build an integrative model that theorizes the effect of IT investments in government size. Second, on the empirical side, even though I consciously select control variables that may influence the size of state governments and an appropriate estimation technique, there must be other unaccounted factors in my estimations, which may cause the results to be biased or inconsistent. I will report further sensitivity analyses in future works.
As this is one of the early studies on the IT value in the public sector, there are numerous opportunities for future research. The present study discovers that IT investments reduce the size of government expenditures, but it is unclear whether such a reduction comes from decreasing or deteriorating public services such as education or infrastructure. An unanswered question thus is whether IT assets in governments generate value by improving the quality of public services. Researchers may study the relationship between IT investments and such quality measures for public services such as educational achievement, public safety, or healthcare quality. I expect that this study sparks interest on IT value in the public sector among IS scholars.
This study measures a relatively short-term effect of IT spending on government expenditures, which turns out to be negative. Future studies may investigate a long-term effect on government size. It may be the case that in the longrun, an improvement in efficiency and productivity of government production that is driven by greater IT use indeed increases the demand for public services. It would therefore be interesting to investigate how the short-term and the long-term influence of IT investments differ in the public sector.
Further, researchers may study the incentives of IT investments in governments. One might wonder why governments invest in IT at the apparent absence of profit-seeking motivation and competitive pressures. As I find, IT investments lead to smaller government, an effect that is in contrast to bureaucrats' interests, according to the bureaucracy theory. Which factors motivate government officials to spend part of their budget in IT? Future research can explore this research issue.
Another venue for further studies is to find the contextual effect of IT investments and government size. Specifically, I am interested in investigating the moderating effect of IT governance. A number of studies in the IS literature have investigated the antecedents of IT governance structure in for-profit firms (Brown and Magill 1994, Sambamurthy and Zmud 1999) , but the performance effect of IT governance mechanisms, on the other hand, has not been fully studied in the IS literature. I will hypothesize the moderating effect of IT governance by expanding the theoretical discussions above. In particular, I am interested in the role of legislatures and bureaucrats in IT management and how the involvement of legislatures and senior officials in state governments shape the relationship between IT investments and government size.
